Bangladesh is underdeveloped and inhibits elaborate description. This is partly because most of the research was conducted until recently by the Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development at Comilla (Blair 1974: 122; Van Schondel 1976) and has been based on agro-economic surveys in the densely populated and fertile region of Comilla itself. The Comilla findings formed the basis of extrapolations for Bangladesh as a whole, providing an ¡mage of a homogenous agrarian structure described in terms of small-holding farmers. Thus an overall consideration of the land distribution and tenure data on Bangladesh in the 1960s threw up two misleading generalisations: the absence of a substantial class of landlords and landholders; and the low level of absolute average size holding. From this data it is usually concluded that "the rural economy of Bangladesh is best described as a peasant economy based on small family farms operated primarily with family labour" (e.g. Abdullah and Nations, 1974: 9 ; also Bose, 1973) . The Comilla cooperative programme was predicated ort the ideological assumption that class division within the 'peasant economy' was structurally insignificant. More recently this view has been modified by reognising a critical distinction between 'surplus' peasants on the one hand and subsistence, below subsistence and landless on the other: i.e., that minor variations of landholding were nevertheless critical (Abdullah and Nations 1974; Bertocci 1972) . In this view, and along with many subsequent evaluations of the Comilla cooperative strategy (Khan 1971) elites do not constitute a class, since the division of the holding between sons ensures a process of cyclical mobility, or, indeed, 'cyclical Kulakism' (Bertocci 1972.) assumptions about the nature of power in East Bengal which has traditionally been analysed solely in terms of the aspirations of an urban petty-bourgeoisie leading an undifferentiated mass of the peásantry against the common oppressor from the Weste.g. the language movements and the rise of Bengali nationalism (Alavi 1972; Ahmed 1973: 419-48; Ah 1975; Maniruzzaman 1975) . More specifically it focuses our attention on the role of these classes in transforming the entire social formation both through their support for the Muslim League and the quest for an independent Pakistan, and through their subsequent influence over agrarian legislation and state policy in agriculture. The Muslim League's policy of partition had the related advantage of removing the stratum of Hindu landlords from their stultifying influence over the aspirations of the Muslim jotedars; while the attack on feudal rural relations had to be contained at the point when the conditions for their own appropriation of land and surplus had been fulfilled.
However the political significance of this class of Muslim jotedars in the North and West of Bangladesh can only be considered in conjunction with that of the Bengali petty bourgeoisie consisting of small traders, shopkeepers, professionals, teachers, junior officials and clerks in the provincial services. In a country where the entire urban population was never more than 10 per cent, this class had close kinship and other connections with the economically stronger classes of raiyats and jotedars in the countryside. It is not difficult therefore to see the relationships beween the frustrated aspirations of a Bengali petty bourgeoisie whose language (and career prospects) was threatened and those of the larger Muslim farmers and peasants whose own development was restricted by West Pakistani colonial policy. In this way the language movements coLild expand into broader Bengali Nationalism and lay the foundation for the creation of a reformist nationalist party (the Awami League) which successfully combined the respective concerns of the larger rural petty commodity producers and the urban petty bourgeoisie to reproduce West Pakistani capitalism in the East through a constitutional bourgeois-democratic transformation, with associated career prospects for the Bengali intelligentsia in the private and public sectors. A combination of populist rhetoric and rural vote banks (Ayoob 1971) (Bose 1973: 35; Government of Bangladesh 1973: 84, passim) . For example, rice production increased at 0.7 per cent per annum compared with a population growth of nearly 3 per cent per annum. Even the production of jute declined in the l950s, picking up in the 1960s only because of a large increase in the acreage, since yields were declining. This evidence on jute is consistent with the tendency for landholding to polarise, with land being transferred out of the hands of small, mainly subsistence and rice-cultivating peasants. The squeeze on agriculture, both through adverse terms of trade and the low level of state investment, restricted the capacity of richer peasants to expand their control directly over productive assets. However, this squeeze, together with increases in population, increased the vulnerability of the poorest peasants. Without the dubious advantages of a zamindari system to rely on, their urgent requirements for credit, for land to sharecrop, or to sell their labour could only be met by the richer, surplus peasantsat a cost.
By thus restricting the development of rural capitalism in East Bengal, Pakistani colonialism encouraged the development of other relations of exploitation: usurious moneylending often related to the mortgaging of land; leasing of land for sharecropping even where the owner's holding is small and within the capacity of family labour; and the use of hired labour, sometimes migratory, at depressed wage rates (Alamgir 1974: 737-818; Clay 1976) . In addition to taking on the moneylending functions of the 'deported' Hindu Banias, the Muslim surplus peasants extended their participation in petty trade, either diversifying themselves into retail and marketing businesses in 42 local hats (bazaars) and towns, or financing the petty, peripatetic trading activities of the landless and near-landless at usurious rates (Wood 1976 These 'antediluvian' forms of capital represent capital in the sphere of exchange, and have to be distinguished from capital in the sphere of agricultural production which alone would be consistent with the development of capitalist social relations in the countryside. Thus under these conditions the distortion of the pre-capitalist mode of production does not necessarily entail its substituticri by a capitalist mode.
This deveÏopment of capital in the sphere of circulation of commodities with the related 'antediluvian' forms has the effect of undermining independent small peasant production. There is an increase in landlessness and mortgaging. Indebtedness abounds and the small peasants' land is gradually expropriated de facto if not de jure so that the small peasant is transformed into a sharecropper (of his own legal holding); a dependent labourer and servant; an insecure peripatetic trader carrying shoulder loads; a migrant agricultural labourer; a hopeful on the urban labour market; or a vagrant (Wood 1976) . In these circumstances the extension of wage labour cannot be interpreted as a sign of advancing capitalist relations. Labour is free neither in the sense of being unbonded, nor in the sense of the availability of alternative employment since the industrial development of East Bengal was also restricted.
These exploitative relations are institutionally disguised at the level of social relations in the village, both consciously through verbal agreements and informal arrangements backed by sanctions; and more pervasively through the class-based management of the hegemonic, egalitarian Muslim kinship ideology which denounces interest rates and the like.
But the specificity of agrarian conditions in East Bengal goes beyond that derived from the status of the province as a sub-colony of Pakistan when the variations in rural class structure are considered. The general effect of Pakistani imperialism was not to produce a uniform set of responses all over East Bengal, instead it was articulated through the inherited regional differences iii social relations. Thus under the 'minifundist' conditions of he Dacca-Comilla region the relationships of debt and mortgage were the dominant 'antediluvian' form to emerge; while sharecropping and landlessness became more prevalent in the West and North-West, where a class of 'surplus' Muslim peasants was established ii the form of larger landholder and petty landlords. This is not to suggest that the other forms of non-productive relation were not present in each of the areas, but that the variations above constituted the determining relation in each case.
